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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

State of Utah
STATE TAX COMMISSION OF
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

CASE NO.

vs.

6240

ARCHIE L. LARSEN and LEE H.
WHITLOCK, a partnership,
Defendants.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On August 21, 1936, the plaintiff filed a complaint
in the District Court of Duchesne County, State of Utah
against Archie L. Larsen and Lee H. Whitlock, a claimed
partnership, for claimed delinquent sales tax due the
State of Utah. Summons was issued and on August 19,
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1936, was personally served upon the defendant, Archie
L. Larsen. Thereafter, on November 13, 1936, a default
certificate was entered by the clerk of the court, wherein
it was stated that in the action Archie L. Larsen and
Lee H. Whitlock, a partnership, had been served with
process and had failed to appear and answer plaintiff's
complaint and that the time allowed by law for answering
had expired and that the default of the defendants, Archie
L. Larsen and Lee H. Whitlock, a partnership, in the
premises was duly entered according to law. (Tr. 1-1011-13 Ab. 1-2-3.)
On November 19, 1936, judgment was entered in
the action, wherein it was again stated that the defendants, Archie L. Larsen and Lee H. Whitlock, a partnership, had been regularly served with process, had failed
to appear and answer to the complaint, the time for answering had expired and the default of the defendants
in the premises had been duly entered according to law
and ordering judgment against the defendants in the
sum of $2,082.79, with interest and court costs. (Tr. 14;
Ab. 4.)
Nothing further was done in the matter so far as the
defendant, Whitlock, was concerned until December 24,
1936, when a summons and return was filed with the
clerk of the court. The return of summons stated that
the sheriff received the summons on August 22, 1936 and
served the same upon Lee H. Whitlock, one of the partners of a partnership, the within named defendant, personally, by delivering to and leaving with said defendant
in Salt Lake City, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, a

-~
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3
true copy of the su1nn1ons on the 17th day of December,
1936 and that at the time of the service of a copy of
the sun11nons served, he endorsed the date and place of
service and added his name and official title thereto. The
return was dated December 18, 1936. Thereafter, on
:Jiarch 7, 1938, a default certificate was entered and filed
by the clerk, purporting to enter the default of Lee H.
\Vhitlock, individually, in the premises. Thereafter, a
second judgment was made, entered and filed in the
cause, ordering, adjudging and decreeing that plaintiff
have judgment against each of the defendants individually in the Rum of $2082.79, with interest thereon at the
rate of 1% per month from the date thereof until paid.
(Tr.15-16-22-23; Ab. 5-6-7.)
On :J1arch 8, 1939, the defendant, Lee H. Whitlock,
by his attorneys, appearing specially for the purposes of
the motion, filed a motion, supported by the affidavit of
Lee H. Whitlock, to vacate, set aside and quash the alleged or pretended service of summons upon the defendant, Whitlock, for the reason that summons in the cause
had not been served upon him. The affidavit is to the effect
that summons had not at any time been served upon Mr.
Whitlock either by serving the same upon him personally
or hy leaving a copy of the summons at his usual place
of abode; namely, 1207 South 15th East Street, Salt Lake
Cit~·. Utah~ with some suitable person or at any other
place or in any other manner or way anrl that the return
of summons filed in the action on December 2-t, 1936,
signerl h~' l\L Landau, as deputy sheriff, stating that he
Rerverl the summons on affiant on December 17, 1936,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

4
is wholly and entirely false, as said M. Landau did r
serve said summons or copy of the summons or any co
of any complaint upon Mr. Whitlock on December :
1936 or upon any other date or at any other time eitb
prior or subsequent thereto or in any manner or w~
and, further, that no other person or party ever serv
summons upon him in any manner or way. The affida1
was not denied by the plaintiff. (Tr. 26-27; Ab. 7-8-9-1
At the time of the hearing upon the motion, eviden
was introduced by the defendant, Whitlock, in support
his motion. At the beginning of the testimony of :ru
Whitlock, the plaintiff made the following objections:
''MR. BROWN: Now I would like to ent
an objection at this time, Your Honor, please,
all of the testimony that is going to be taken wi
respect to his motion, as it is our contention tb
the court should not hear this motion at this tin
and it is entirely out of place." (Tr. 42; Ab. 1
The only other objection made by plaintiff was rna
at the conclusion of the testimony of Oscar W. Moy
Jr., a witness for appellant, which was as follows:
''If your Honor please, we have the same (
jection to J\1r. Moyle's testimony as applied to lV
Whitlock's testimony, that it is incompetent,
relevant and immaterial and in as much as o
contention is that this proceeding is out of li
and not before the ~ourt at this time, we obj~
to it." (Tr. 52; Abs. 19)
The court reserved its ruling upon both objectiOJ
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By the evidence introduced, it was conclusively established that no sun1mons was ever served upon appellant and that the return of the sheriff to the effect that
sumnl.ons 'vas served upon Mr. Whitlock on December
17, 1936 was wholly false. There was some evidence to
the effect that the Sheriff of Salt Lake County left a
copy of a summons and complaint entitled in this action
in the business office of appellant at 219 South Main
Street, Salt Lake City, Utah, during the absence of Mr.
\Vhitlock from the State of Utah and that there appeared
across the face of the copy of summons inclosed in the
envelope a statement signed by Mr. Landau that the
summons was served on December 17, 1936, at Salt Lake
County, Utah, on the defendant, Archie L.' Larsen (Tr.
60; Abs. 20). It was further conclusively established that
no summons or copy of complaint had ever been served
upon the appellant personally or by leaving a copy of
the summons or complaint at the residence of appellant
in Salt Lake City, Utah, to-wit, 1207 South 15th East
Street. It was further shown that Mr. Whitlock was advised by counsel that the summons and copy of complaint
left in his office was not an attempt to serve him with
summons, but was an attempted service upon the defendant, Larsen, as shown by the statement on the face
of the summons and, further, that the cause of action set
forth in plaintiff's complaint was against the partnership
if one existed and would not support a personal judgment
against appellant except as to his interest in the partnership if, in fact, he was a partner (Tr. 42-3-4-50-2; Abs.
16-19). Plaintiff rlirl not offer an~, evidence to refute
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or deny any of the matters set forth in the affidavit of
appellant or the facts orally testified to at the time of
the hearing conclusively establishing that the return of
summons was false and that, in fact, no service of any
kind had ever been made upon appellant.

Statement of Errors Upon Which Appellant Relies
for Reversal of the Order of the Court Below
Appellant has made nine assignments of error upon
which he relies for a reversal of the order of the court
made December 21, 1939, denying appellant's motion filed
March 8, 1939, and refusing to grant appellant the relief prayed for in said motion or any relief (Abs. 21-22).
Assignments of Error Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 are directed
to the failure of the court to grant said motion filed March
8, 1939. Assignments of Error Nos. 6, 7 and 8 are directed to the failure of the court either upon the motion
as made or upon its own motion to vacate and set aside
the judgment entered against the appellant on March 9,
1938, when it was conclusively established and shown to
the court that the court did not have jurisdiction over
the appellant to enter said judgment against him. Assignment No. 9 is that the order made December 21, 1939,
denying appellant's motion was not supported by the
evidence. Appellant relies upon each and all of these
errors for a reversal of the order of the court appealed
from.
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Statement of Particular Questions Involved
for Determination
By reason of the proceedings taken by appellant, is
he entitled to the relief prayed for or for any relief~
The determination of this question necessitates a determination of the following questions:
Is the attack made by the defendant upon the
judgment of ~larch 8, 1939 a collateral or a direct attack
upon the judgment~
1.

2. If a collateral attack, will it lie when made within
a year's time after the entry of judgment when maae in
the same proceeding and while the court retained jurisdiction over the matter~
3. Should the motion as made be treated as a motion to vacate the judgment~
4. When, as here, the plaintiff permits the appellant
to conclusively prove and establish that the court was
without jurisdiction to enter its judgment of March 8,
1939, should the court on its own motion vacate the judgment~

5. Should the trial court have sustained the motion
and quashed the summons without disturbing the judgment~

6.

Is appellant's

remed~·

dependent upon the pro-
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visiOns of Section 104-14-4, Revised Statutes of Utah,
1933, and must he, therefore, submit himself to the jurisdiction of the court and make a showing of a good defense
to the action, or is he entitled to relief wholly independent
of the provisions of said section~

ARGUMENT
The Attack Made by the Defendant Upon the Judgment of March 8, 1939 Is a Direct Attack Upon the
Judgment and When It Was Shown That the Return
of Summons Was False, it Became the Duty of the
Court to Quash the Service of the Summons.
Appellant contends that under the rules and practice of the courts of this state and the decisions of this
Honorable Court any proceeding brought in the same action attacking the validity or effect of a purported judgment is a direct attack thereon and that, being a direct
attack, the court may hear extrinsic evidence going to
the validity or invalidity of the judgment particularly
with respect to matters directed to the jurisdiction of the
court over the subject matter of the action and to the
jurisdiction of the court over the person of the defendant.
It cannot be denied that the proceedings here brought by
appellant directly attack the validity of the judgment.
Regardless of the particular name given to the proceeding, it did, in fact, directly attack the validity of the
judgment by conclusively establishing the lack of jurisSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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diction of the court over the person of the defendant.
)Vhen it was shown to the court that the judgment was
entered without its having jurisdiction over the person
of the defendant, the court should and owed a duty to
appellant to grant the relief sought.
In the case of Intermill vs. Nash, 94 Utah 271, 75
Pac. (2d) 157, decided January 13, 1938, this court,
through its Honorable Justice Larsen, very thoroughly
reviews the authorities and cases distinguishing between
"direct" and "collateral" attacks upon judgments and
fully sets forth the distinguishing features of the two
types of proceedings. In that case, this court unanimously held that where the proceedings adopted by the defendant in attacking a judgment are pursued in the proceedings wherein the judgment is rendered, it is a direct
attack thereon and that the true test is the purpose of
the attack and vulnerability of the judgment and not the
name or the description of the assault itself. We quote
from Page 279 of the Utah report of the decision:
" ( 4) Remedies pursued in the proceedings
wherein the judgment is rendered are direct attacks; otherwise, the:v are looked upon as collateral. (citing cases)"
And from Page 280 :
''To differentiate clearly, one must have in
mind not the terms used, but the reason underlying
the differentiation. The terms 'direct' and 'collateral,' as used in reference to attacks on judgSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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ments, apply to the purpose of, or the method employed in, the attack, and not as descriptive of the
assault itself. The term 'direct attack' means a
proceeding brought, instituted, or maintained directly for the purpose, that is, with the direct and
primary objective, of modifying, setting aside,
canceling or vacating, or enjoining the enforcement of the judgment. The term 'collateral attack' means the questioning of the validity of a
judgment in a collateral proceeding; that is, a proceeding other than the one in which the judgment
is entered, and which is not brought, instituted,
or maintained for the express purpose of modifying, setting aside, canceling, or enjoining the execution of the judgment. It is a denial of, or questioning the validity of, a judgment, when the judgment is or becomes involved in the cause, only incidentally and collaterally, and its enforcement or
validity is not the primary issue in or purpose of
the proceeding.''
And Page 285 from the concurring opinion of the Honorable Justice Wolfe:
''There have been many confusing statements
as to direct and collateral attacks on judgments.
vVe are interested more in the manner of testing
in any given case whether a judgment may be attacked than in nomenclature. As says the prevailing opinion, generally, a direct attack is one the
purpose of which is to eliminate what is or purports to be a judgment, whereas a collateral ~t
tack attempts not to obliterate the judgment, but
to avoid the effect of it when used in another suit.
But I think there is a form of direct attack which
really only avoids the effect of a purported judgment. In· order to make this more clear, I list the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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types of direct attacks as I see th~m: (1) that
attack which attempts to set aside a judgment by
a motion or proceeding brought in the same suit
in which the judgment was rendered. (2) * * * *"
Of course, in the matter at bar, the very validity of
the judgment is being attacked by this proceeding and
the very purpose of the proceeding is to invalidate the
purported judgment against the appellant. It is a proceeding in the very action in which the judgment is entered and is within the time that the court retains jurisdiction of the cause.
The case of Norton vs. Atchison, etc. RR Company,
97 Cal. 388, 32 Pac. 452, is probably the leading and most
cited case on the question of proceedings brought after
judgment to obtain relief from a purported judgment for
failure of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant
when such failure of jurisdiction does not appear upon
the face of the judgment roll. The proceeding followed
in that case was very similar to the proceeding followed
by appellant. In that case, after entry of judgment, the
defendant filed a motion to quash the service of sun1mons,
to set aside and vacate the default of the defendant and to
set aside and vacate the judgment which had been entered
against it. The court, after holding that the proceeding
pursued was not brought under Section 473 of the California Code of Civil Procedure, which is identical with
our Section 104-14-4, Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933, and
after holding that the evidence conclusively established
that the defendant had not been served with summons in
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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the action, on Page 391 of the California report of the
case, states:
"It was clearly, then, the duty of the court to
quash the service of the summons, when it appeared to it that the return of such service was
false; and the vacating of the judgment was an incident which necessarily followed, provided that
the proceeding by motion by which this result was
sought to be accomplished was a proper one.''
(Italics ours.)
The court then proceeded to say that the defendant
did not base his claim to relief on his own mistake, his
inadvertence or surprise, but based it on the ground that
the judgment was void and the motion used was the
proper remedy. Further, the court states on Page 393:
'' 'Vhere a return shows that a non-resident
was personally served with sun1mons within the
state, and it is made to appear to the court that
such return was false, it would be strange if, within
a reasonable time, the court could not, upon application, set aside the service or the false return of
service and vacate the judgment.''
It is clear from this case that the attack is really
made upon the service or false service of summons and
that the vacating of the judgment is a mere formality or
incident which necessarily follows upon the quashing or
setting aside of the service of the summons. The motion made by the appellant in the case at bar clearly is
an attack upon the judgment though the vacating of
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the judgment has not been expressly requested therein.
The very foundation of the judgment is attacked. Certainly, it is a direct attack 'upon it.
See also Baldwin vs. Burt, 74 N. W. 594,54 Neb. 287,
Page 595:
''The order or decree of the District Court
quashing the officer's return on the summons, is,
in effect, an order vacating the foreclosure decree. It is true, the court does not expressly say
that the foreclosure decree is vacated or set aside,
but precisely the same result follows from the order as if it was couched in those express terms.
To say that the order under review is not one vacating the foreclosure decree is to discredit entirely the purpose and effect of the order. * * * *
When the court madf! the order ~under consideration quashing the officer's return, the foreclosure
decree fell of itself." (Italics ours.)
If the Attack Made by the Defendant Upon the

Judgment Is Held to Be a Collateral Attack, It Will
Lie When Directed Against a Void Judgment when
Made Within a Year's Time After the Entry of Judgment in the Same Proceeding and While the Court
Retains Jurisdiction Over the Proceeding.
There is conclusive authority holding that where a
judgment is void as distinguished from being voidable,
that is, where there has been a service of summons upon
the defendant and the service of sun1mons is defective in
:-;orne particular but not absolutely void as in this case,
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the judgment may be attacked either collaterally or directly if the attack is made within the period of time
that the court retains jurisdiction over the cause even
though the defect does not appear upon the face of the
record.
Gray vs. Hall, 255 Pac. 246, (Calif.), Page 252:
"It cannot be denied that, in those cases in
which judgments have been rendered without any
or insufficient service, or where the party not only
has had no opportunity, but is so ignorant of any
proceeding against him as not to have been able
to avail himself of the remedies which the law
gives him until he has lost them all, the judgment
is absolutely void. Such a judgment may be attacked at any time, directly or collaterally. People
vs. Harrison, 84 Cal. -607-608, 24 Pac. 311. ''
Bancroft Code Pleading Practice and Remedies, 10year Supplement, Volume 2, Page 1795, Paragraph 963:
''Effect of Irregularities and Defects Generally. Defects in the summons or service are not
available on collateral attack unless they are such
as to render the judgment absolutely void.''
(Italics ours.)
There being no service of summons of any nature
made upon the appellant in this case and he having not
appeared therein in any manner or way, it is clear that
the judgment here is void and not merely voidable.
33 c. J. 1082:
''A personal judgment rendered against a deSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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fendant without servire of process upon him, or
other sufficient legal notice to him, is without jurisdiction and void, unless he has appeared voluntarily, because jurisdiction of the person is essential in such cases, and constructive service is insufficient to give jurisdiction in personam.''

33

c. J. 1080:
"Fonnal process or notice served in the manner authorized or required by law is essential to
support a judgment; mere informal knowledge of
the pendency of the action is not sufficient. Thus,
a judgment is a mere nullity where service is
made upon a third person instead of upon the
actual defendant, notwithstanding defendant had
actual knowledge of the action and the attempted
service.''

We do not admit that the appellant had even informal knowledge of any pending suit against him for
personal judgment and the evidence produced conclusively shows that the appellant was advised by counsel
that no such action was pending against him.
We, therefore, contend, as hereinabove stated, that
it is wholly immaterial in this case whether the procedure followed by the appellant is termed by the court as
a collateral or direct attack on the judgment, for the
reason that the proceeding is brought within a year's
time as permitted by law while the court still had jurisdiction in the matter and where, as here, it has been
conclusively established that the court had no jurisdlcSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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tion whatsoever over the appellant to enter the judgment
against him.

Plaintiff Permitted the Appellant to Conclusively
Prove and Establish That the Court Was Without
Jurisdiction to Enter Its Judgment of March 8, 1939
and the Manner of Attack, Therefore, Is Immaterial.
The plaintiff did not file any reply or denial of any
kind to the sworn affidavit of the appellant conclusively
establishing that the return of summons upon which the
judgment was based is utterly false nor did the plaintiff
offer any evidence to refute the oral evidence presented
at the hearing upon the motion to the same effect. The
only objections made were as set forth on Pages 14 and
19 of the abstract of record. The first objection which
was presented only to the introduction of the oral evidence was that the court "should not bear this motion
at this time and it is entirely out of place.'' The other
objection was that the evidence was incompetent, irrelevant and immaterial and that the proceeding was out
of line and not before the court at the time. The reasons,
if any, why the court should not hear the motion at the
time, or why the motion was out of place or why the
proceeding was out of line and not before the court at
the time of the hearing or why the evidence was incompetent, irrelevant or immaterial do not appear in either of
the objections or elsewhere in the record. We contend
that the objections made if, in fact, the proceeding was
technically objectionable, being directed to the quashing
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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of the sun1mons and not to the vacating of the judgment
in express terms, were insufficient to raise any question
as to the technical form of the motion, especially in
light of the fact that the facts stated in the i}.ffidavit
supporting the motion were not denied. The objections
were directed only to the offering of oral evidence and
did not attack the motion itself or the affidavit filed in
support thereof. The motion and the affidavit without
the oral evidence introduced were sufficient to entitle
appellant to the relief sought.
It has been definitely held that where the evidence
is undisputed and is established beyond all controversy,
the judgment may be vacated at any time or in any manner either by direct attack or collateral attack, the rule
being the same as when the judgment appears to be void
upon its face. We quote from Hill vs. City Cab and
Transfer, 79 Cal. 188, 21 Pac. 728, Page 191 :
"But this rule is not that a judgment which
is void will be enforced as if it were valid, but
that it cannot be shown to be void except in certain
ways. If the party, however, should admit the
facts which show the judgment to be void, or if
he should allow them to be established without
opposition, then, as a question of law, upon such
facts, we do not see why the case is not like that
where a judgment is void upon its face. In the
present case, the findings established the fact
that there was no service of summons upon or
authorized appearance by the defendant. And
none of the evidence is brought up, nor does the
question appear to have been raised by exception
or demurrer or in any other way. The facts, thereSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

18
fore, must be taken to be established hy the record
beyond all controversy and, upon such facts, the
la~ is that the judgment is void."
The· above case was clearly a case of a collateral
attack upon the judgment, the invalidity of the judgment
being set up as a defense to a separate suit brought for
the renewal of the judgment.
See also People vs. Harrison, 107 Cal. 541, 40 Pac.
956, in which case proceedings attacking the judgment
were brought three years after judgment. The attack
was clearly an indirect or collateral attack thereon and
the defects did not appear upon the face of the record.
The court held that where the facts showing no service
were admitted or not denied it remained a question of
law as to the character of the service, quoting with approval the above quotation from the Hill vs. City Cab
and Transfer case.
As above stated, the plaintiff has not in any manner
or way denied the facts set forth in the sworn affidavit
attached to appellant's motion, which conclusively show
no service of summons, and, further, introduced no evidence upon the hearing of this cause to refute appellant's
oral evidence conclusively establishing that no service
of summons was made upon the appellant or appearnce
made by him in the action. The above authorities are,
therefore, applicable.
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diction of the Court or Support His Motion with a
Showing of a Good Defense to the Action.
The Supreme Court of California, construing Section
473 of the California Code of Civil Procedure, which is
identical to Section 104-14-4 of our Revised Statutes of
1933, has definitely held that the relief provided for by
said Section -173 of the California Code is applicable only
where the party attempting to attack a judgment or
process is proceeding on the ground of excusable neglect,
mistake, inadvertence or surprise on the part of the party
so attacking the judgment or proceeding and that where
the attack is on the ground that the court has never obtained jurisdiction over the party due to no neglect of
any kind upon the part of said party, he is entitled to
relief wholly independent of said Section 473.
The case of Norton vs. Atchison, etc. RR Company,
hereinabove cited, is clear authority for this contention.
On Page 390 of the California report, the Supreme Court
of California states:
"The recent case of Jacks v. Baldez, 97 Cal.
91, 1night also be cited in support of what appellant deems to be the correct position. But those
authorities relate to cases which come clearly
within, or should have been brought under, the
provisions of said section 473. rrhe main provision of that section is, that a court may relieve
a party from a judgment taken against him
'through his mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect'; and it is quite clear that the provision just quoted has no application to the ground
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upon which respondent moved in the case at bar.
Defendant here is not asking relief from its neglect or mistake or default or any character; its
contention is, that the court has no jurisdiction
over it, and no power to compel it to answer to
the action. It does not ask to be allowed to come
in and answer, but contends that, in its situation,
it cannot be called upon to answer; therefore,
there can be demanded of it no affidavit of merits.
In the cases cited the parties making application
to set aside the judgment confessed some neglect
or misconduct from which they sought to be relieved, and thus come clearly within the provisions
of said section, and, of course, were compelled to
comply with the provisions of the section, under
the construction which the court had given them.''
The California court also quotes the following from
Freeman on Judgments, Paragraph 108:
"In all cases an affidavit of merits must be
made and filed, except where it appears that the
court has never acquired jurisdiction of the moving party, and that its judgment against him is
void; but in this class of cases he is entitled to
relief, independently of those statutes.''
The case of Vaughn vs. Pine Creek Tungsten Company, 265 Pac. 491, is a later California case holding to
the same effect, and there are other California cases so
holding, and our own Supreme Court in the case of
Atkinson vs. Atkinson, 43 Utah 53, likewise has held
that, where the court had no jurisdiction over either the
subject matter or the party, the party affected could obSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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tain relief wholly independent of that section. We quote
from the ~\tkinson case as follows, Page 56:
"\Yhere a judgment is obtained by default
upon constructive service, and the defendant
moves to set the judgment aside by motion within
the year allowed by our statute, or if he seeks to
be permitted to open up the default judgment for
the purpose of making a defense to the original
action upon the ground of the excusable neglect
or inadvertence, or for some other sufficient cause,
the practice is well settled that, in order to have
the judgment set aside and the cause reopened,
he ordinarily must submit himself to the jurisdiction of the court, and must also set up a good defense to the action in the form of an affidavit or
answer. But is this the rule without exception,
and must a party also do this in a case wherein
the plaintiff has been guilty of fraud in inducing
the court to assume jurisdiction of the action in
which the default judgment is entered, or where,
as here, the court never acquired jurisdiction of
the person, because the order for service by publication and the pretended summons were void~
If a plaintiff can enforce such a rule, then he in
a divorce action would be permitted to take advantage of his own wrong, since he could cmnpel
the defendant in such an action to submit his or
her person to the jurisdiction of the court, when
neither personal nor subject-matter jurisdiction
(the marriage which constitutes the res) could be
obtained in any other way."
"There may be some good reason why a
party may not desire to have the case tried in a
particular court or state, and if so such person·
need not, under circumstances like those in this
case, subject his person to the jurisdiction of the
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court in order to be entitled to the relief sougl
Under such circumstances the respondent was E
titled to have the judgment set aside as a matt
of right and not as a matter of grace. See De
bins v . .:\1cNamary, 113 Ind. 54, 14 N. E. 887,
Am .St. Rep. 626; 1 Black on Judgments ( 2d Ec
section 348. ' '
From the above authorities, it is very clear th
where,· as here, the court has not obtained jurisdicti1
over the defendant to render a judgment, the defenda
is entitled to relief wholly independent of Section 1C
14-4 of our Revised Statutes. Appellant is not claimi1
relief because of any mistake, inadvertance or excusal
neglect on his part as he has not been guilty of a1
such mistake, inadvertence or neglect. He is mere
claiming and asking relief against a void judgment e
tered against him without jurisdiction and without noti
of any kind to him of the pendency of the proceeding.
WHEREFORE, appellant respectfully contends th
the trial court erred in denying appellant's motion and
refusing to grant appellant any relief from the vo
judgment entered against him and that this Honorab
Court will rectify said errors.
Respectfully submitted,
MOYLE & MOYLE
Attorneys for Appellant.
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